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Deeper investigations into the causes of spinoffs have highlighted the importance of strategic 
disagreements in driving some employees to resign and found a new venture. Motivated by 
this literature, we construct a new theory of spinoff formation driven by strategic disagree-
ments, and explore how well it explains the emerging empirical regularities.  
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I. Introduction 
In recent years various studies have traced the origins of entrants in innovative new indus-
tries in the U.S. and elsewhere in order to understand how the backgrounds of entrants influ-
ences their performance. In industry after industry, one class of entrants has stood out: firms 
founded by employees of incumbent firms in the same industry. We call these firms intra-
industry spinoffs. In many innovative industries, both old and modern, upwards of 20% of 
the entrants are intra-industry spinoffs, and these firms consistently outperform other de 
novo entrants and disproportionately populate the ranks of the industry’s leaders (Sleeper 
[1998], Klepper [2002], Agarwal et al. [2004], Thompson [2005], Boschma and Wenting [2007], 
Buenstorf [2007], Buenstorf and Klepper [2007], Roberts et al. [2007], von Rhein [2008], 
Chatterji [2008]). Various regularities concerning the firms most likely to spawn intra-
industry spinoffs, the circumstances that are conducive to such spinoffs, and the relationship 
between the performance of intra-industry spinoffs and their parents are also starting to ac-
cumulate. 
The prominence and distinctive performance of intra-industry spinoffs raises fundamental 
theoretical and policy-related questions. What defines a firm’s activities versus the kinds of 
activities a firm’s employees pursue in their own startups? Are incumbent firms systemati-
cally missing out on good opportunities or are firms limited in the number of projects they 
can pursue and/or in their ability to protect their intellectual property? Should legal policies, 
such as the enforcement of employee non-compete covenants, be loosened to encourage intra-
industry spinoffs or tightened to discourage them? Answers to these questions hinge on un-
derstanding why employees leave established firms to start firms in the same industry and on 
the forces governing the occurrence of intra-industry spinoffs. 
Theories proposed to account for spinoffs tend to fall into three camps. In the first, an em-
ployee makes a serendipitous discovery of some economic value. The discovery is in principle 
more valuable to the incumbent firm that it would be to a startup, but information asymme-
tries of one form or another persuade the employee to implement the discovery through his 
own startup rather than reveal it to his employer.1 In the second type of model, the discovery 
                                          
1 See Anton and Yao [1995], Wiggins [1995], Bankman and Gilson [1999], Gromb and Scharfstein 
[2002], Amador and Landier [2003], and Hellman [2007]. Common themes are: i) firms cannot 
commit to a contingent contract that adequately rewards the employee for his discovery and the 
subsequent employee effort needed to implement it; and (ii) non-contingent contracts that are ex 
ante acceptable to the firm will not always be sufficient to prevent a departure by the employee. 
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is common knowledge within the firm but is less valuable to the incumbent than it would be 
to a start-up, because its implementation would cannibalize existing rents or because the firm 
has limited competence to evaluate the idea, particularly when the idea is tangential to the 
firm’s main activities.2 In the third type of model, employees learn from their employers 
about how to profitably compete in their industry, especially when their employer is success-
ful. They exploit this knowledge by setting up their own firm in the same industry.3 We as-
semble mini-case studies that have been developed for the leading intra-industry spinoffs in 
three industries, the historical automobile and the modern semiconductor and laser indus-
tries, to gain insight into the reasons spinoffs occur. The evidence points to a phenomenon 
not captured by existing theories: disagreements among leading decision makers concerning 
fundamental ideas about technology and management that prompt dissidents to leave and 
start their own firms. 
The management literature stresses the importance of firms forging a consensus about their 
strategy (e.g., Cyert and March [1963], Andrews [1971], Dess and Priem [1995]). With the 
exception of some recent work by Van den Steen [2004, 2005, 2006], however, few attempts 
have been made to model the formation of a consensus and the emergence and consequence 
of disagreements among members of management teams. The primary goal of our paper is to 
construct a model of spinoffs based on the idea of disagreements consistent with our case 
study evidence and to explore its consistency with the empirical regularities that have been 
accumulating about intra-industry spinoffs. 
In our model, firms are formed of like-minded individuals and then employees get different 
signals about the best strategic direction for their firm. They communicate their signals to 
each other, which causes their views to converge. However, inevitably decision makers in 
some firms have difficulty evaluating the ideas that employees propose, which can lead to the 
underweighting of good ideas and to disagreements. If others outside the firm are better able 
to evaluate the ideas and the ideas are sufficiently worthwhile to justify the costs of starting 
a new firm, then a spinoff will be formed.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we lay out the main findings that have been 
accumulating from recent empirical studies of intra-industry spinoffs. In Section III we exam-
ine the role of internal disagreements in the formation of intra-industry spinoffs in automo-
                                          
2 See Pakes and Nitzan [1983], Tushman and Anderson [1986], Henderson and Clark [1990], Chris-
tensen [1993], Klepper and Sleeper [2005], and Cassiman and Ueda [2006]. 
3 See Agarwal et al. [2004] and Franco and Filson [2006]. 
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biles, semiconductors, and lasers. In Section IV we present our model and derive its implica-
tions for the timing of spinoffs, their performance, and the performance of their parents. In 
Section V we discuss some normative implications of our theory. 
II. Empirical Regularities  
Most of the studies of intra-industry spinoffs examine U.S. manufacturing industries during 
their first 30 to 35 years when entry is greatest, including automobiles (Klepper [2007a, 
2007b]), tires (Buenstorf and Klepper [2007]), semiconductors (Brittain and Freeman [1986], 
Klepper [2007c]), disk drives (Agarwal et al. [2004], Franco and Filson [2006]), lasers (Sleeper 
[1998], Klepper and Sleeper [2005], Sherer [2006]), medical devices (Chatterji [2008]), and 
biotechnology (Mitton [1990], Stuart and Sorenson [2003]). A few parallel studies have been 
conducted for automobiles in Great Britain (Boschma and Wenting [2007]) and automobiles 
(von Rhein [2008]) and lasers (Buenstorf [2007]) in Germany. Intra-industry spinoffs have 
also been studied in U.S. law firms (Phillips [2002]) and Australian and New Zealand wine 
producers (Roberts et al. [2007]). The main focus of these studies is on the rate at which 
firms spawn intra-industry spinoffs and the performance of the spinoffs. Also touched on is 
the extent to which knowledge is transferred from “parents” to spinoffs. Similar issues were 
examined in a recent study (Eriksson and Kuhn [2006]) of all spinoffs across the entire Dan-
ish private sector.4 
As the number of studies of intra-industry spinoffs accumulate, it is possible to identify a 
number of common findings across industries. Five patterns show up consistently in all or 
most of the industries where they have been studied, both in the U.S. and elsewhere. First, in 
autos, tires, semiconductors, disk drives, and lasers, better-performing firms, measured by 
longevity, peak market share, early entry, product quality and/or product scope, have higher 
intra-industry spinoff rates.5,6  Second, in autos, biotechnology, lasers, and semiconductors, 
                                          
4 Another broad study that covers somewhat different issues examines the rate at which publicly 
traded firms spawned VC-financed spinoffs (Gompers et al. [2005]). 
5 In the U.S. laser industry, however, the rate at which firms spawned spinoffs initially producing 
a particular type of laser was unrelated to the firm’s performance in that laser type, proxied by 
the total number of years it produced the laser (Klepper and Sleeper [2005]).  
6 These findings could merely be due to better firms being larger and thus having more employees 
that could potentially found firms. Agarwal et al. [2004] and Franco and Filson [2006] test this 
idea in disk drives using the number of disk drives produced as a measure of firm size. They find 
that even after controlling for firm size, the quality of a firm’s technology and whether it entered 
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firms acquired by non-industry incumbents have higher intra-industry spinoff rates around 
the time of their acquisition, while in autos and lasers (but not biotechnology or semiconduc-
tors) firms acquired by industry incumbents also have comparably higher intra-industry 
spinoff rates around the time of their acquisition. Relatedly, in semiconductors firms that 
hired a CEO from outside the company have higher intra-industry spinoff rates, which ac-
cords with findings from the Danish study that spinoffs are more likely in firms whose CEO 
has recently changed. Third, in autos, lasers, semiconductors, and law firms (but not disk 
drives or tires), the rate at which firms spawn intra-industry spinoffs tends to rise through 
about age 14. While most firms exit by age 14, among those that continue the spinoff rate 
tends to fall as they age further.7 Fourth, in autos, disk drives, lasers, medical devices, tires, 
and wine, the performance of intra-industry spinoffs8 is superior to other de novo entrants 
and is comparable if not superior to diversifiers from related industries. Similarly, in the 
Danish study spinoffs that are formed for positive reasons (i.e., not due to the parent exiting 
in the year of the spinoff) and that are in the same industry as their parent (i.e., intra-
industry spinoffs) survive longer than other new entrants. Fifth, in autos, tires, semiconduc-
tors, disk drives, and law firms (but not lasers), the better the performance of parent firms9 
then the better the performance of their intra-industry spinoffs.10   
The five regularities are summarized in Table 1 in the order they will be addressed in the 
discussion of the theoretical model. 
 
                                          
earlier into the production of new disk drives both positively affect the firm spinoff rate (in 
Agarwal et al. [2004] size also positively affects the firm spinoff rate whereas in Franco and Filson 
[2006] it negatively, but insignificantly, affects the firm spinoff rate). 
7 Mitton’s [1990] evidence indicates that among biotechnology firms in San Diego, the spinoff rate 
increased through age 10, consistent with the patterns found in autos, lasers, and law firms. 
There were no firms in his sample older than age 10, however, to judge whether spinoff rates de-
clined at older ages. 
8 Based on longevity, peak market share, scope, years to first VC funding, or pre-money valua-
tion. 
9 Based on longevity, market share, and/or quality of technology. 
10 In disk drives, Agarwal et al. [2004] found that firms with better technology had spinoffs with 
better technology, and firms (of all types) with better technology survived longer. However, in a 
direct analysis of the relationship between spinoff longevity and characteristics of parents, Franco 
and Filson [2006] did not find that spinoffs from parents with better technology survived longer 
(if anything, they survived shorter). 
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TABLE 1. Intra-industry Spinoff Regularities 
A The probability of an intra-industry spinoff first rises and then falls with 
firm age, making middle age the most likely time for intra-industry spinoffs. 
B Firms that are acquired have a higher rate of intra-industry spinoffs around 
the time of their acquisition, particularly when they are acquired by firms in 
other industries. A change in the firm’s CEO, particularly from outside the 
firm, similarly increases the rate of intra-industry spinoffs. 
C Better-performing firms spawn intra-industry spinoffs at a higher rate. 
D Better-performing firms have better-performing intra-industry spinoffs. 
E Intra-industry spinoffs perform better than other de novo entrants and com-
parably if not better than diversifying entrants. 
 
III. Spinoffs and Disagreements 
The statistical regularities provide indirect evidence about the impetus for intra-industry 
spinoffs. In this section we present more direct evidence about the impetus for prominent 
intra-industry spinoffs in the historical automobile industry and the modern semiconductor 
and laser industries. These mini-case studies are based on historical accounts and testimony 
of the founders of the spinoffs presented in Klepper [2007a, 2007c], Klepper and Sleeper 
[2005], and Sherer [2006]. 
A. Automobiles 
Consistent with the statistical regularities, the four firms that spawned the most spinoffs and 
accounted for many of the leaders of the industry, Olds Motor Works, Cadillac, Ford, and 
Buick (which evolved into General Motors), were four of the leading firms in the industry. 
Table 2 summarizes information for the leading spinoffs of these firms in terms of their year 
of entry, parent firm, impetus for their formation, prior position of their principal founder (in 
the parent firm), and their main source of finance based on Klepper [2007a]. 
Olds Motor Works had seven spinoffs, equaled only by Buick/GM, and in a more condensed 
time period than Buick, reflecting its limited life as an independent firm. Before its entry 
into automobiles, Olds was a successful engine producer headed by Ransom Olds, the son of 
 6
its founder. Olds introduced the first great car in the industry, the one-cylinder Curved Dash 
Runabout. To finance its entry into automobiles, Ransom Olds had to give up control of his 
company to Samuel Smith, a wealthy businessman with little experience in manufacturing. 
All but the first spinoff of Olds Motor Works occurred after Ransom Olds clashed with Sam-
uel Smith and his son over whether to produce larger cars and whether to improve the manu-
facturing process to lower production defects. The clash resulted in Ransom Olds being 
forced out of the firm in 1904 when it was at its peak. Subsequently, he founded Reo with 
support from some of the other stockholders that had helped finance his entry into autos. 
Two years later the head of sales, Roy Chapin, and the chief engineer, Howard Coffin, left 
Olds Motor Works to found E.R. Thomas-Detroit with support from E.R. Thomas, who him-
self was a producer of a high-price car in a company bearing his name. They proposed a new 
four-cylinder car that was a compromise between the one-cylinder Curved Dash Runabout 
and the larger cars favored by the Smiths and left Olds when the Smiths withdrew support 
for the car at the last minute. Three years later two other top Olds employees, with support 
from one of their relatives, Joseph Hudson, a department store owner, formed Hudson with 
Chapin and Coffin to produce a new, low-priced four cylinder car that was designed by Cof-
fin to compete with the newly introduced Model T. Chapin and Coffin had gotten Hugh 
Chalmers, a well-known marketing executive at NCR, to buy half of E.R. Thomas’ stock in 
E.R. Thomas-Detroit to dilute his control over the company. Chalmers was not used to such 
major changes in his product and let the new car be developed in a separate company in 
which initially he took stock but then traded it for shares in his own firm. By this time Olds 
Motor Works had fallen out of the ranks of the leading firms under the Smiths’ direction and 
had been rescued by the newly formed General Motors, which acquired it in 1908. 
With the exception of Hupp, the other leading spinoffs in Table 2 were also born out of dis-
agreements in their parent firm. Both of Cadillac’s leading spinoffs involved Alanson Brush, 
a talented engineer-inventor that left Cadillac after a clash with the head of the firm over the 
use of his patents. Brush Runabout was subsequently formed by Brush and Frank Briscoe, 
one of Olds’ initial subcontractors, to produce a new small car that Brush designed to test 
out some of the ideas he had developed at Cadillac. In the same year, Brush was also in-
volved in the formation of Oakland with Edward Murphy, the owner of a successful carriage 
company that was impressed with the Brush Runabout and asked Brush to design a car for 
him. Both companies were soon acquired. Brothers John and Horace Dodge had been the 
primary producers of Ford’s cars from the outset and held 10% of Ford’s stock. They left 
Ford to found their own firm, Dodge Brothers, with their own funds when they felt threat-
ened by Henry Ford’s continual efforts to integrate backwards and Ford dawdled on their 
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TABLE 2: Leading Automobile Spinoffs 
FIRM (PARENT) YEAR  IMPETUS POSITION FINANCE 
Reo (Olds) 1904 Management dispute Head Past stockholders 
E. R. Thomas-Detroit 
(Olds) 
1906 Proposed car  rejected Sales manager, Chief 
engineer 
Auto man 
Hudson (Olds & E. R. 
Thomas-Detroit) 
1909 Proposed car  rejected Sales manager, Chief 
engineer 
Relative 
Brush (Caddy) 1907 Dispute over  patents Top engineer Auto man 
Oakland (Caddy) 1907 Dispute over  patents Top engineer Carriage man 
Hupp (Ford) 1909 Entrepreneur Asst. Supt. Minimal 
Dodge Bros. (Ford) 1914 Rejected buyout Producers, Stockhold-
ers 
Self 
Chevrolet (GM) 1911 Management dispute Head Self 
Durant (GM) 1921 Management dispute Head Past stockholders 
 
proposal to buy them out. Both of Buick/GM’s leading spinoffs were founded by William 
Durant, who had catapulted Buick to success and subsequently organized General Motors 
(GM) with Buick as its centerpiece. Twice Durant was ousted from GM after failing to inte-
grate the many acquisitions he engineered and GM floundered. The first time he organized 
Chevrolet and two other firms with his own funds and concentrated on producing a small car 
to compete with the Model T based on efforts he had initiated at Buick that were abandoned 
by the bankers that took over the management of GM after his ouster. His later startup, Du-
rant Motors, was financed primarily by prior investors in Durant’s ventures. Although ini-
tially successful, an unwise acquisition and expansion into a full range of cars ultimately 
doomed it.  
B. Semiconductors 
Silicon Valley is famous for spinoffs in the semiconductor industry. Table 3 summarizes in-
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formation on the leading Silicon Valley spinoffs through 1986 based on Klepper [2007c]. Con-
sistent with the statistical regularities, six of the leading spinoffs came out of Fairchild Semi-
conductor, which was the first great Silicon Valley firm that accounted for an extraordinary 
total of 24 spinoffs. Two of the other leading spinoffs came out of National and Intel, which 
themselves were leading spinoffs of Fairchild that accounted for the next most semiconductor 
spinoffs with nine and six respectively. 
Similar to Olds, Fairchild was racked by internal turmoil that precipitated many of its 
spinoffs and eventually led to its decline. Fairchild itself was the byproduct of a disagreement 
at its parent firm, which led eight of its top employees to form Fairchild in 1957 with sup-
port from a Long Island defense contractor that subsequently exercised its right to purchase 
the firm. Fairchild Semiconductor co-invented and pioneered the integrated circuit (IC) and 
became the leader of the industry along with Texas Instruments.  However, when its head of 
research, Gordon Moore, did not recognize the full potential of ICs, two groups of founders 
and top employees left to form Amelco and Signetics with support from downstream firms. 
Subsequently Fairchild was racked by internal problems related to the separation of R&D 
and manufacturing and control by a distant owner. National was formed in 1967 by the head 
of production, Charles Sporck, who was frustrated by lack of recognition and meager stock 
options from the parent company. Tensions involving the parent company and the inability 
of Fairchild Semiconductor to commercialize new products led Moore and Robert Noyce, the 
head of Fairchild Semiconductor, to depart in 1968 to found Intel. One year later the head of 
marketing, Jerry Sanders, left to found AMD after he clashed with Lester Hogan, who had 
been brought in from Motorola to turn around Fairchild. Many years later, the head of Fair-
child, Wilf Corrigan, left to form LSI Logic with venture capital support after Fairchild was 
acquired by a non-semiconductor firm whose direction he disagreed with. This was the cul-
mination of a long decline that eventually led to Fairchild’s demise as an independent semi-
conductor producer in 1987. 
Many of the other leading spinoffs involved strategic disagreements. Linear Technologies 
emerged out of National and Cypress Semiconductor out of AMD over divergent views about 
the potential of analog devices and Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductors respec-
tively. Both firms were financed by venture capitalists. Similar to AMD and LSI Logic, other 
leading spinoffs resulted from tensions that arose as the result of an acquisition or when a 
new CEO was brought in from outside the company. This was the impetus for both Elec-
tronic Arrays and Intersil, with Intersil receiving financial support from two downstream 
firms. Similarly, VLSI was formed with venture capital support by the head of Synertek after 
Synertek was acquired by a non-semiconductor firm. In all three of these cases, the parent 
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firm exited the industry soon after the formation of its spinoff. 
 
TABLE 3: Leading Silicon Valley Semiconductor Spinoffs, 1957-1986 
FIRM (PARENT) YEAR  IMPETUS POSITION FINANCE 
Fairchild  (Shockley) 1957 Strategic disagreement (silicon 
transistors), Management con-
flict 
R&D/managementFairchild Camera & 
Instrument 
Amelco (Fairchild) 1961 Strategic disagreement (ICs) Founder Teledyne 
Signetics (Fairchild) 1961 Strategic disagreement (ICs) IC R&D pioneers Investment banks 
Electronic Arrays 
(GME) 
1967 Management conflict after 
acquisition by non-
semiconductor firm 
Senior engineer Not available 
Intersil (Union Car-
bide) 
1967 Stock options, management 
conflict with non-
semiconductor parent 
Founder SSIH and Olivetti 
National (Fairchild) 1967 Stock options, management 
conflict with non-
semiconductor parent 
Head of produc-
tion 
National  
Semiconductor 
Intel (Fairchild) 1968 Management conflict, techni-
cal frustration (MOS) 
Founder Venture Capital 
AMD (Fairchild) 1969 Management conflict after 
CEO hired from outside firm 
Head of marketing Minimal capital 
Zilog (Intel) 1974 Personal tensions Top R&D engineerExxon 
VLSI (Synertek) 1979 Management conflict after 
acquisition by non-
semiconductor firm 
Founder Venture capital 
LSI Logic (Fairchild) 1980 Management conflict after 
acquisition by non-
semiconductor firm 
CEO Venture capital 
Linear (National) 1981 Strategic Disagreement (linear 
circuits) 
Head of linear di-
vision 
Venture capital 
Cypress (AMD) 1982 Strategic Disagreement 
(CMOS) 
Division manager Venture capital 
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C. Lasers 
Spinoffs have also been prominent in lasers, which come in many different forms. Table 4 
summarizes information for spinoffs in each of the eight main types of lasers based on Klep-
per and Sleeper [2005] and supplementary information collected by Sherer [2006].  
Similar to autos and semiconductors, internal disagreements were prominent in the formation 
of these spinoffs, and in laser spinoffs generally (Sherer [2006]). The first spinoff, Uniphase, is 
illustrative. Its parent, Spectra Physics, studied various ways to improve its Helium Neon 
(HeNe) laser, which was used in scanners. It chose not to pursue one of the options it ex-
plored, which was to miniaturize the laser. An R&D manager that worked on the project felt 
that miniaturization had more promise than Spectra Physics did and left along with an engi-
neer and a marketing manager from another firm to form Uniphase to pursue their ideas. 
Their efforts led to the development of hand-held scanners, which launched Uniphase’s suc-
cess. 
 
TABLE 4: Representative Laser Spinoffs 
Firm (Parent) Year  Laser Impetus Position 
Uniphase (Spectra-Physics) 1981 HeNe Strategic disagree-
ment 
Technical employees 
Laakman (Hughes) 1980 CO2 Shunned new tech-
nology 
Technical  employees 
JEC (Holobean) 1980 Solid  State Parent acquired & 
moved 
Technical employees, 
GM 
Cynosure (Candela) 1992 Dye Strategic disagree-
ment 
Founders 
Lexel (Coherent) 1974 Ion Technical disagree-
ment 
Technical  employees 
Laser Diode (RCA) 1968 Semiconductor Parent failure Technical  employees 
Questek (Lambda-Physik) 1984 Excimer Parent acquired & 
compensation 
U.S. president 
Omnichrome (Xerox) 1982 HeCd Internal dispute Technical  employees 
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The stories behind a number of the other spinoffs in Table 4 are similar. Husband and wife 
technical workers at Hughes licensed technology they had patented there to develop a vari-
ant of Hughes’ Carbon Dioxide (CO2) laser that Hughes, which was primarily a defense con-
tractor, was not interested in developing. The CEO and co-founder of Candela, a producer of 
Dye lasers, along with an engineer and the director of regulatory affairs at Candela, pur-
chased its research division and founded Cynosure to develop a smaller, cheaper Dye laser 
they were working on after Candela declined to commercialize it. Coherent explored the use 
of a ceramic tube to improve its Ion laser, but abandoned it due to manufacturing problems. 
An engineer that suggested a solution to the problem that was not heeded left with two 
other employees to form Lexel to pursue their ideas. After RCA encountered difficulties de-
veloping a semiconductor laser for defense applications, an engineer involved in the effort left 
with three other managers/technical workers to found Laser Diode Labs to develop a compa-
rable laser. Last, after an internal dispute, Xerox abandoned Helium Cadmium (HeCd) la-
sers, but technical employees left to form Omnichrome to continue producing the HeCd la-
sers.  
The other two spinoffs in Table 4, JEC and Questek, were both formed after their parent 
firm was acquired. In the case of JEC its parent moved and ceased servicing some of its old 
buyers, opening an opportunity for two technical employees and a general manager to start a 
firm to service these customers. In the case of Questek, tensions over compensation from the 
sale of the parent led its U.S. president to found a competing firm. 
D. General Themes 
Three themes of note emerge from the case studies: 
1. Many of the spinoffs were based on technical ideas that originated within their parent firm 
but the parent declined to support aggressively or at all. For example, this includes the two 
ideas for smaller cars proposed by Coffin and Chapin at Olds Motor Works and E. R. Tho-
mas-Detroit, the development of integrated circuits at Fairchild, and the miniaturization of 
helium neon and dye lasers at Spectra Physics and Candela respectively. In some instances, 
disagreements over the ideas blossomed into full-fledged fights over the control of the parent 
firm. Invariably internal champions for these ideas ended up leaving in frustration after fail-
ing to convince the powers that be of the merit of their ideas. This is a common theme 
among spinoffs (Garvin [1983]). While surely influenced by financial factors, the primary mo-
tive for the champions leaving to found their own firms appears to have been the desire to 
pursue ideas they believed in (cf. Braun and MacDonald [1978, pp. 138-139]).  
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2. A number of the spinoffs were based on disagreements over the strategic direction of the 
parent firm and/or fundamental management practices related to the organization of the 
parent and its method of rewarding high-level employees. Many of these disagreements were 
prompted by a change in control of the firm associated with a change in ownership or a new 
CEO being brought in from outside the firm. Similar tensions seem to have existed in firms 
that were financed and controlled from the outset by firms in another industry. While lead-
ing firms tended to spawn the most spinoffs, some, most notably Olds and Fairchild, were in 
decline when the bulk of their spinoffs occurred. 
3. Founders of the spinoffs were often top managers, including founders and CEOs, and/or 
top scientists and engineers. It was rare for founders in automobiles and semiconductors to 
be able to finance their own firms. They often received funding from upstream and down-
stream firms, executives and firms in the industry itself, relatives, and in the semiconductor 
industry venture capitalists, many of whom were themselves veterans of the industry. 
IV. A Model of Disagreements and Spinoffs 
The case study evidence has highlighted the conflicts that arise when members of a manage-
ment team fail to agree on the strategic direction their firm should take, and how sufficient 
disagreement may induce some individuals to abandon the firm to pursue their own ideas. In 
this section we develop a model of disagreements and explore whether such a model can ex-
plain the empirical regularities concerning spinoffs that were summarized in Table 1.  
The model builds on the Bayesian dial-setting model of Jovanovic and Nyarko [1995]. The 
firm’s problem is to choose a strategy, x, as close as possible to a target, θ. Given θ, strategy 
x yields a value of the firm given by ( )2v A xθ= − − . The strategy is chosen by a team of n 
managers, who do not know θ and must learn it over time from observation of noisy signals. 
Each manager joins the firm at time zero with prior belief that θ is a draw from a Normal 
distribution. All managers have the same prior mean of zero, but their prior variances may 
differ. In each subsequent period, managers observe distinct signals drawn from Normal dis-
tributions with common mean θ and potentially distinct variances. By Bayes’ rule, beliefs at 
the end of period t are also Normal, and we denote the subjective means and variances by θit 
and σit, i = 1,2, . . ., n. There is no gain to experimentation when both prior and signals are 
normally distributed, so manager i believes the optimal strategy is 
it
x θ= , yielding an ex-
pected value of 
it
A σ− . Of course, the firm can only implement one strategy. We assume the 
firm implements a weighted average of the choices of each individual, 1
n
it i it
x ω θ== ∑ , where 
1 1
n
i i
ω= =∑  and ωi reflects the influence of individual i in the firm’s decision making process. 
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From individual i’s perspective, the strategy chosen by the firm may not be optimal. His ex-
pectation of the firm’s value is 
 ( )2[ ]it it tE v A E xθ = − −     
           2
it it
A σ= − ∆ − , (1) 
where =
it it t
xθ∆ −  measures i’s disagreement with the firm’s strategy. Relative to i’s optimal 
strategy, the shortfall in the expected value of the firm is 2
it
∆ . Let k denote the cost of orga-
nizing a firm. We assume that individual i chooses to start his own firm as soon as 2
it
k∆ ≥ . 
In modeling disagreement among members of a management team, we must immediately 
contend with an intellectual challenge. In each period, it is assumed that each decision maker 
conveys the mean of his subjective distribution to the other decision makers in the firm in 
order to communicate the strategy he thinks the firm should follow. This is tantamount to 
conveying the decision maker’s prior mean and the mean of his past signals on θ, which each 
decision maker can use to update his subjective distribution on θ. Geanakoplos and Pole-
markcharkis [1982] have shown that under general conditions this will cause the views of all 
decision makers to converge, so that they all have the same subjective distribution for θ and 
no disagreement can occur. Two mechanisms can be used to prevent this convergence and 
preserve the possibility of disagreements. First, one may assume that managers have prior 
beliefs that are held privately and that differ from the priors of their colleagues (cf. van den 
Steen [2001, 2004]). Second, one may assume that managers are not precisely informed about 
the accuracy of their colleagues’ signals. Amador and Landier [2003] and Klepper and 
Thompson [2007] have taken this second approach in studies of spinoffs that assume all indi-
viduals are overconfident, causing them to put more weight on their own signals than on 
those of other decision makers in the firm. We induce disagreements using a blend of both 
approaches. 
Suppose that in some firms certain decision makers are more likely to have superior ideas, 
but other decision makers in the firm are unable to recognize this. Indeed, in many of the 
case studies the limited backgrounds of key decision makers seem to have hindered their abil-
ity to evaluate new ideas that arose within the firm.  We model this as follows.  Suppose 
that the nth decision maker in these firms joins the management team better informed about 
the target than his colleagues, and that he subsequently also receives more precise signals. 
For compactness, we characterize this with a single parameter, (0, 1)α ∈ . Assume that the 
true distribution of θ is (0, (1 ) )N θα σ− ; that individual n knows this, while his colleagues 
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know only that it is a draw from (0, )N θσ ; and that individual n receives signals distributed 
as ( ), (1 )N θ α σ− , whereas all other decision makers in the firm receive signals distributed as ( ),N θ σ . Individual n knows the variance of his prior and signals, but the other decision 
makers in the firm believe that every decision maker has the same prior variance of σθ and 
the same signal variance of σ. The parameter α varies across firms. When 0α > , we shall 
use the shorthand terms α-type individual and α-type firm to index the superior ability of 
individual n and to identify the  type of firm he works for. Firms without an α-type individ-
ual, whose managers are trying to learn the value of a draw from (0, (1 ) )N θα σ− , will be 
termed β(α)-type firms. 
Disagreements cannot arise in β(α)-type firms, so we focus here on the dynamics governing 
α−types. Let 1
it it
s t s−= ∑  denote the mean signals of individual i, which we assume are 
conveyed to all decision makers in the firm. Individuals i = 1, 2, …, 1n −  weigh everyone’s 
information equally based on their beliefs about the precision of the information, which yields 
a posterior mean of 
 ( )1
n
iti
it
t s
n t
θ
θ
σθ σ σ
== +
∑
,    i = 1, 2, . . . , 1n − . (2) 
In contrast, an α-type individual weighs his own information more than anyone else’s, yield-
ing a posterior mean of  
 
( )
( )
1
1
(1 ) n
nt iti
nt
t s s
n t
θ
θ
λ σ α
θ σ σ
−
=+ −= +
∑
. (3) 
where / [( 1)(1 ) 1] 1n nλ α= − − + > .11 The difference between the α-type individual’s opti-
mal strategy and the strategy chosen by the firm is then given by 
 ( ) ( )11(1 ) ( 1) ( (1 ) 1) nnnt nt itit s sn t θθ
ω σ λ λ ασ σ
−
=
−∆ = − + − −+ ∑ . (4) 
                                          
11 In calculating equations (2) and (3), we have also assumed that each individual treats the pri-
ors of his colleagues as signals. This does nothing to change the zero subjective mean, but it alters 
the subjective variances prior to observing the private signals. For individuals i n≠  the variance 
prior to observing the private signals is ;/ nθσ  for individual n it is (1 ) ./ nθλ α σ−  The assump-
tion is of no great consequence, but it serves to simplify what follows by placing several expres-
sions on common denominators.  
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Individuals i = 1, 2, …, 1n −  have the same views about what the firm should do. If indi-
vidual n is not an α-type, he shares this common view. But each α-type individual places 
more weight on his own information than anyone else’s and so differs from their view about 
what the firm should do. He only has a limited influence on the firm, so the firm chooses a 
strategy different from his optimal choice.  
Disagreements are driven by differences in opinions about θ, but they do not depend at all 
on its value. Nonetheless, the realized value of θ does affect the value of the firm. To see this, 
note that the expected value of the firm conditional on θ is  
 ( )2| ( | )t t tE v A x dF xθ θ θ
∞
−∞
  = − −   ∫ , (5) 
where   
      (1 )
t n it n nt
x ω θ ω θ= − +  
     ( ) ( )1
1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
( )
n
n n it n n nt
i
t
s s
n t
θ
θ
σ ω λω α ω λωσ σ
−
=
  = − + − + − + +  ∑ . (6) 
The random variable 
nt
s  is normally distributed with mean θ and variance / tασ . The vari-
able 11
n
i it
s−=∑  is also normal, with mean ( 1)n θ−  and variance ( 1) /n tσ− . Hence ( | )tF x θ  is 
the distribution of a normal random variable with mean / (1 / )
t
t θµ θ σ σ= + , and variance 
 ( ) ( )2 2 22 2var( ) ( 1) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )( )t n n n n
t
x n
n t
θ
θ
σ σ ω λω α α ω λωσ σ
 = − − + − + − − +  +   , (7) 
which is independent of θ. Rewrite (5) as 
 ( )2| ( ) ( ) ( | )t t t t tE v A x dF xθ θ µ µ θ
∞
−∞
  = − − − −   ∫  
                           2 2( ) 2( ) ( ) ( | ) ( ) ( | )
t t t t t t t t
A x dF x x dF xθ µ θ µ µ θ µ θ
∞ ∞
−∞ −∞
= − − + − − − −∫ ∫  
                            
2
2 var( )
t
A x
t θ
σθ σ σ
  = − −  + 
, (8) 
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which is strictly increasing in α and ωn. Even though the superior ability of the α-type agent 
is not recognized by his colleagues, the firm benefits from the greater precision of his signals. 
As var( )
t
x  is independent of θ, |
t
E v θ     is strictly decreasing in 2θ . That is, the closer θ is 
to zero, and the closer the mean of the signals is to θ, the greater will be the value of the 
firm.12  
We shall explore the ability of this framework to explain the empirical regularities in the fol-
lowing subsections. Before doing so, however, six issues related to stylizations in the model 
designed to keep the analysis simple merit some brief discussion.  
• The value of the firm. In Jovanovic and Nyarko [1995], the choice of x in each period yields 
an immediate one-period observed payoff. The payoff, which may be profit, output, produc-
tivity, or some other measure of performance, is stochastic. The decision-maker’s task is to 
try and infer the value of θ from these noisy payoffs. The current belief about θ determines 
the decision maker’s subjective expectation of the next period‘s payoff as well his subjective 
expectation about the value of the firm. We have chosen to  directly model beliefs about the 
expected value of the firm. This is in part for compactness. But more substantively, many 
disagreements involve learning about strategies that have yet to yield directly observable 
payoffs. Consequently, they often also involve signals that are not a function of one-period 
payoffs. In one sense our model is more general than the formulation in Jovanovic and 
Nyarko [1995], because our noisy signals may include, in addition to any one-period payoffs 
that are observed, less tangible types of information.  
• Invariance of the target. While our model assumes that each firm must learn the value of 
an invariant target, this does not necessarily imply that the environment in an industry 
never changes. We do not need to assume that all firms face the same target.  The model is 
consistent with, for example, later entrants facing different draws, and perhaps a different 
distribution of draws, of the target than earlier entrants due to the evolution of an industry’s 
technological frontier.  We can also analyze the consequences of a single, unanticipated 
change in the target, which we consider in subsection IV.B. In addition, it is possible to ex-
tend our model to include continuously evolving stochastic targets, such as might result from 
continuous change in the economic environment. Tools such as the Kalman filter are avail-
                                          
12 Of course, decision makers do not know how close their prior mean or their signals are to 
θ when they make their strategic choices—we assume they receive no objective information about 
the quality of their choices. It is only ex-post that the value of the firm is revealed to decision 
makers. 
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able to model learning about the distribution of stochastic processes. We do not explore this 
extension in the current paper. Although doing so might provide some additional insights, it 
is a complication that is unnecessary for our primary goal of exploring the model’s consis-
tency with the empirical regularities.   
• The stopping criterion. We have assumed that individual i forms a spinoff the first period 
that 2
it
k∆ ≥ . However, when 2
it
k∆ =  the value of continuing with the parent firm is strictly 
greater than the value of forming a spinoff, because remaining with the firm allows the agent 
to observe the size of the next period’s disagreement. Modeling sophisticated agents aware of 
this option value requires a dynamic programming approach to the optimal stopping prob-
lem. In practice, such analyses have proved intractable, because the stopping region fluctu-
ates over time in complex ways. As a result researchers have frequently resorted to approxi-
mating the dynamic stopping problem by replacing the time-varying stopping region with its 
asymptotic counterpart.13 It turns out that the approximation is exactly equivalent to ignor-
ing the continuation value, so our assumption that a spinoff is formed as soon as 2
it
k∆ ≥  
implements the standard approximation.  
• Decision making authority. The weights used in determining the action of the firm are ex-
ogenous. One might suppose that the weights are determined by the outcome of some bar-
gaining process, or that the firm is designed to create weights that lead to efficient actions. 
In the latter case, the optimal weights depend upon the accuracy of managers’ beliefs about 
the accuracy of their own and their colleagues’ signals. As we shall shortly see, if all manag-
ers are precisely informed about the accuracy of everyone’s signals, an arbitrary set of 
weights is both efficient and acceptable to team members engaged in bargaining, because in 
this case disagreements never arise. When managers are not precisely informed about the 
accuracy of everyone’s signals, disagreements may arise, and some weighting schemes will 
dominate others. However, there is no obvious way for the firm to select the ideal weighting 
scheme when it depends upon mistakes about signal precision, of which managers are un-
aware.  
• No strategic transmission of information. We assume the firm’s action is a weighted aver-
age of each manager’s reported belief. When disagreements exist about the optimal action, 
there may be incentives for each manager to mislead his colleagues by engaging in cheap talk 
about his beliefs. Our focus, however, is on whether the limited ability of decision makers to 
                                          
13 Jovanovic’s [1979] classic model of labor turnover takes this approach; Thompson [2008] has 
done so recently in a model of marital discord. 
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assess novel ideas can account for the various empirical regularities.  Accordingly, we assume 
throughout that agents accurately represent their beliefs and do not engage in cheap talk.14  
• No competitive implications of spinoffs. Spinoffs are potential competitors to their parents. 
Thus, parents frequently discourage them by means of contractual sticks such as non-
compete covenants, legal sticks such as filing suits for intellectual property infringement, and 
monetary carrots such as schemes to reward employees for revealing their ideas. Incumbent 
concerns about potential competition from spinoffs has been the subject of some theorizing 
(see, e.g., Amador and Landier [2003], Hellman [2007]), but there remain many open ques-
tions. However, we put these issues aside in this paper in order to focus on the mechanics of 
spinoffs spawned by disagreement. The task we have set for ourselves turns out to be com-
plex enough, and it is only after understanding these mechanics that we can begin to explore 
how parent firms might respond to competitive threats from potential spinoffs.  
A. Firm age and the probability of a spinoff 
The first regularity in Table 1 is that the hazard of spinoff formation first rises, then falls, 
with increasing age of (parent) firms. The model predicts this for α-type firms. A spinoff oc-
curs as soon as 2
nt
k∆ > . We are consequently interested in the distribution of the Markov 
time, T, that satisfies the first-passage problem 
 { }2min : nT kττ τ= ∆ ≥ . (9) 
To solve (9), we transform it into a first-passage problem involving a standard random walk 
and then follow conventional procedure by analyzing its continuous-time analog (cf. Cox and 
Miller [1965]). Define 
 
var( )t nt
nt
tφ = ∆ ∆  
      
( ) 1 (1 )( 1)
( 1)(1 )
nt
n
t n n
n
θ
θ
σ σ α
ασ σ ω
+ + − −= ∆
− −
. (10) 
                                          
14 The cheap talk problem has been studied in a variety of settings by, inter alia, Crawford and 
Sobel [1982] and Alonso, Dessein and Matousheck [2006]. They find in a range of settings that, 
instead of reporting their beliefs, agents report only an interval in which their beliefs lie. 
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The random variable φt is normal with zero mean and variance t, with increments that are 
independent standard Normals. The continuous-time stochastic process, φ(t), that gives rise 
to the same distribution as φt at t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , is a standard zero-drift Wiener process 
with boundary condition φ(0)=0. We next transform the boundary for the first-passage prob-
lem, so that the distribution of T is unaffected by the transformation of the stochastic proc-
ess. This is achieved upon replacing 
t
∆ with k±  in (10), to obtain two absorbing barriers 
for φ(t) given by 
 ( )* * *1 2( )t tφ φ φ= ± + , (11) 
where 
 *
1
(1 (1 )( 1))
( 1)(1 )
n
n n k
nθ
σ αφ
ασ ω
+ − −=
− −
 (12) 
and 
 *
2
(1 (1 )( 1))
( 1)(1 )
n
n n k
n
αφ
α σ ω
+ − −=
− −
. (13) 
The transformed problem is therefore one of finding the distribution, * *
1 2
( | , )F T φ φ , of the 
Markov time T that satisfies 
 { }* *1 2min : ( )tT t t tφ φ φ= ≥ + . (14) 
Equation (14) describes a first passage problem for a Wiener process to either of two barri-
ers, both of which are moving away from the mean of the process at a linear rate (see Figure 
1). A convenient consequence of this transformation is that all parameter changes affect the 
problem only by moving the barriers. Note, for example, that if 0α =  or 1
n
ω =  the absorb-
ing barriers are infinitely far from the origin and hence unattainable by any sample path. 
Thus, β(α)-type firms, and α-type firms in which individual n makes all the decisions, never 
produce spinoffs. 
The distribution * *
1 2
( | , )F T φ φ  can be written explicitly and is given as Theorem A.2 in Ap-
pendix A. It is easy to verify that the density, ( | )F T′ i , is unimodal and has boundary con-
dition (0) 0F ′ = . It then follows that the hazard of spinoff formation,  
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( ) ( )/ (1 ( ))h t F t F t′= − , begins at zero and rise monotonically, at least until the mode of the 
density is reached. We also show, in Appendix A, that ( )* *1 2lim | , 1T F T φ φ→∞ < , so eventu-
ally the hazard must decline to zero. However, we must resort to numerical examples to show 
the hazard declines monotonically after reaching its peak. Figure 2 illustrates a typical nu-
merical plot, showing a sharp rise to a unique maximum, followed by a more gradual and 
asymptotic decline towards zero. Thus, consistent with the first empirical regularity in Table 
1, the model predicts the rate of spinoff formation first rises and then falls with firm age. 
φ
0 t
T
* *
1 2tφ φ+
* *
1 2tφ φ− −
( )tφ
Figure 1. The first passage problem. The sample path 
has been drawn artificially smooth for visual clarity. 
0
t
h(t)
Figure 2. The hazard of spinoff formation 
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Using numerical analysis, it can also be verified that the hazard of spinoff formation h(t) is 
increasing in α and σθ, and decreasing in ωn and k for all 0t > . These comparative dynamics 
are illustrated in the upper panel of Figure 3. Both *
1
φ  and *
2
φ  decline as a result of an in-
crease in α, or a reduction in ωn or k. As a result, the barriers move toward the origin at 
0t =  and become flatter, as indicated by a shift from AA to BB. An increase in σθ reduces 
*
1
φ  but does not affect *
2
φ ; this shifts the barriers inwards without altering their slopes, and 
also unambiguously increases the hazard of spinoff formation. None of these effects are 
counter-intuitive. For example, disagreements are predicated on the existence of α-type indi-
viduals with limited control over the firm’s choice of strategy. As a consequence, it is unsur-
prising that increases in α and reductions in ωn, both of which raise the variance of dis-
agreements at every point in time, increase the hazard of spinoff formation at every point in 
time.  
The effects of changes in the variance of signal noise is perhaps less obvious. A reduction in 
σ reduces *
1
φ  and increases *
2
φ . This shifts the barriers as shown in the lower panel of Fig-
FIGURE 3. Upper panel: Increases in α, and decreases in ωn and k, cause the ab-
sorbing barriers to move from AA to BB. Lower panel: A reduction in σ causes 
the absorbing barriers to move from AA to BB. Only the upper barriers are 
shown. 
0 t
B
A
A
B
( )tφ
φ
0 t
A
B
B
A ( )tφ
φ
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ure 3, and it makes early hits to the barriers more likely and later hits less likely. A reduc-
tion in σ has two effects. First, it increases the rate of learning about θ, and this reduces the 
propensity to disagree. Second, it increases the responsiveness of managers to any given se-
quence of signals, and this encourages disagreement. The latter [former] effect dominates for t 
small [large]. 
B. Acquisitions, CEO changes, and the probability of a spinoff 
The second regularity in Table 1 is that spinoffs are more likely around the time of an acqui-
sition or change in the CEO, especially when the acquisition is by a firm in another industry 
or the new CEO comes from outside the firm. Acquisitions and changes in the CEO may in-
duce changes in the spinoff hazard through two channels. First, they commonly result in re-
organizations that reduce the decision-making authority of incumbent managers. This might 
be especially true when the acquiring firm comes from another industry or the CEO comes 
from another firm and has different ideas about how to run the firm. Second, they may lead 
to a change in the target, θ, that induces new uncertainty about the right strategy. Figure 4 
illustrates the effect of an acquisition or change in the CEO that reduces the decision-making 
weight of individual n. An acquisition or change in the CEO at time τ shifts the absorbing 
FIGURE 4. The effect on the absorbing barriers of decreased influence of 
the nth individual 
φ
0 tτ
a
b
* *
1 2tφ φ+
* *
1 2tφ φ− −
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barriers in and reduces the absolute value of their slopes.15 Some sample paths for φ(t) are 
also illustrated. An individual n that found himself at point a at time τ opts to depart the 
parent company immediately and form a spinoff. Individuals that do not depart at τ none-
theless face increased risk of doing so after τ. For example, an individual arriving at b will 
form a spinoff even though he would not have done so had the parent company not been ac-
quired or a new CEO hired. The hazard increases immediately following an acquisition or 
change in the CEO. Thereafter it may follow either of two possible paths, declining mono-
tonically over time or rising initially before falling. 
C. Firm quality and the probability of a spinoff 
The third regularity in Table 1 is that better performing firms are more likely to spawn a 
spinoff, where performance is measured over a firm’s lifetime. The ex ante probability of a 
firm spawning a spinoff, ( )* *1 2lim | ,T F T φ φ→∞ , is given in Appendix A. It is strictly decreas-
ing in the product of *
1
φ  and *
2
φ ,  
  
( )2* *
1 2
1 (1 )( 1)
( 1)(1 )
n
n n k
nθ
αφ φ ασ ω
+ − −= − − . (15) 
Hence, the probability of a firm ever spawning a spinoff is increasing in θ and independent of 
the realized value of θ.16 We have already shown that the expected quality of (parent) firms 
is increasing in α and ωn, and decreasing in 2θ . Therefore, variations in α across firms will 
give rise to a positive correlation between the expected quality of firms and the rate at which 
they spawn spinoffs, consistent with the third regularity. Intuitively, spinoffs can only arise 
in α-type firms. On average these firms are better performers, and the greater is α then the 
greater is the probability of a spinoff over the firm’s lifetime and the greater the expected 
performance of the firm over its lifetime.  
The case studies indicated that in notable instances, exemplified by Olds Motor Works and 
Fairchild Semiconductor, high quality firms spawned the bulk of their spinoffs when they 
                                          
15 An increase in the degree of uncertainty about the target has a similar effect: in this case the 
absorbing barriers shift in without altering the slope. 
16 This is as expected, as we have already shown by numerical means that the hazard responds to 
these parameters in the same direction. Interestingly, although the variance, σ, of the signals al-
ters the spinoff hazard at every point in time, it has no bearing on the probability that a spinoff 
is ever formed. That is, spinoffs are no more likely in noisy environments than in environments 
with informative signals, but if they happen they are likely to happen earlier. 
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were in decline. This raises the possibility that at the time of their spinoffs, firms that 
spawned spinoffs were not necessarily better performers than other firms without spinoffs, 
although they had been superior at earlier stages of their lives. Our model is consistent with 
these observations, for two reasons. First, the contemporaneous performance of α-type par-
ents that spawned spinoffs at age τ is on average less than that of α-type and β(α)-type non-
parents of the same age. The reason is that emerging disagreements that ultimately led to 
the spinoff  also induce a deterioration in the relative performance of parents. Second, the 
effect of variations in α on the timing of spinoffs causes the average value of α to be greater 
among parents than among non-parents for young firms, but less for older firms. As a result, 
the model implies that (i) firms that are initially superior are more likely to spawn spinoffs in 
the future, (ii) their relative performance declines as they approach the age at which they 
spawn spinoffs and, (iii) firms that spawn spinoffs at ripe ages are worse performers than 
non-parents.  
We establish these implications of the model by numerical means. Let |E vβτ α     denote the 
average quality at age τ of β(α)-type firms, |NE vτ α     the average quality of α-type firms 
that have not spawned a spinoff by age τ, and |SE vτ α     the average quality of α-type firms 
that spawn a spinoff at exactly age τ. Intuition suggests that | |N SE v E vτ τα α   >        because a 
spinoff requires that at least some members of the firm’s management team have received 
misleading signals. At the same time, we expect that | |NE v E vβτ τα α   >        because the for-
mer benefit from the presence of the α-type individual. Appendix B derives explicit expres-
sions for the expected values, numerical analysis of which is consistent with intuition. Figure 
5 provides representative plots showing that | |N SE v E vτ τα α   >       . Although we were unable 
to anticipate the sign of | |SE v E vβτ τα α   −       , Figure 5 shows that it is positive, and that 
|E vβτ α     is in fact very close in value to |
NE vτ α     at any age.17 Thus, as claimed, parents of 
α-type spinoffs are outperformed by α-type and β(α)-type non-parents of the same age. 
Given that the conditional expected value of all α-type firms are the same at birth, regard-
less of whether they subsequently spawn a spinoff, and given that 
0 0
| |NE v E vβα α   >       , Fig-
ure 5 also implies that firms spawning spinoffs must experience a relative decline in perform-
ance prior to spawning a spinoff. 
When variations in α across firms is sufficiently strong, the poor contemporaneous relative 
performance of parents may be more than offset at young ages by selection effects. In order 
for firms to spawn spinoffs when young, the impetus for disagreement must be unusually 
strong. Consequently, the average value of α among parents of spinoffs, 
Sτα , is relatively 
                                          
17 Several alternative choices of parameters yielded similar plots and lead to the same conclusions. 
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high when the parents are young. But 
Sτα  declines monotonically with age because, when 
enough time has passed, high α-type firms have made more progress in learning the target. 
Eventually 
Sτα falls below both the population average, α , and the average of non-parent α-
type firms, 
N τα . Appendix B derives explicit expressions for Sτα  and N τα ; Figure 6 provides 
a numerical illustration using the same parameter values as in Figure 5 except that α is dis-
tributed uniformly over [0.6, 0.9]. For small τ, the difference between 
Sτα  and α  is positive, 
and it is large relative to the differences in the conditional expected values of the firms. 
Thus, although |NE vτ α  >   | |
SE v E vβτ τα α   >       , the differences in unconditional expected 
firm values, SE v E vβτ τ
   −        and 
S NE v E vτ τ
   −       , are likely to be positive for spinoffs launched 
early in their parents’ lives. At some time prior to τ0, these rank orderings are inevitably re-
versed. Note from the lower panel of Figure 6, however, that the bulk of spinoffs are spawned 
when 
Sτα α , so the majority of spinoffs in any sample will be spawned when parents have 
better performance than non-parents.  
D. Parent quality and spinoff quality  
The fourth regularity in Table 1 states that better performing parents produce better per-
forming spinoffs, where performance is again measured over a firm’s lifetime.  In the model, 
the expected value of parents and spinoffs are both increasing functions of α. Consequently, 
FIGURE 5. Average firm values, by age τ. Numerical evaluations of ap-
pendix equations (B.6), (B.9), and (B.12), using parameter values 
n=5, σθ=100, σ=100, k=1, ωn=0.2, and α=0.4 
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it follows directly that the expected performance of parents and spinoffs will be positively 
correlated, consistent with the fourth regularity.  
We can also analyze the relationship between the expected value of parents at the time of 
their spinoffs and the expected value of their spinoffs among firms spawning spinoffs at any 
given age τ, which requires conditioning on sample stochastic paths that induce spinoffs. It 
turns out that the positive correlation between parent and spinoff quality continues to hold, 
reflecting the influence of α-type individuals on both parent and spinoff performance. We 
derive the conditional expected value of a spinoff launched when its parent is age τ, 
|SE vτ α    , in the appendix [equation (B.14)], and compare it with |
SE vτ α      [equation 
(B.9)]. To facilitate comparison, we impose the numerical values, n=5, σθ=100, σ=100, and 
k=1, but leave α, ωn, and τ as parameters. For these parameter values, the expected values of 
FIGURE 6. Upper panel: Average values of α. Nτα  is the expected value at 
age τ  for α-type firms that have not spawned  spinoffs by age τ [appendix 
equation (B.7)]; sτα is the expected value at age τ for α-type firms that 
spawn a spinoff at age τ [equation (B.10)]; α  is the expected value at age 
τ for β-type firms. Lower panel: Density of spinoff formation by age. Pa-
rameter values used are n=5, σθ=100, σ=100, k=1, ωn=0.2;  the distribu-
tion of α is uniform on [0.6, 0.9].  
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parent and spinoff simplify to 
 
2 2 2
100 25 (4 7) 25 1
| ;
(1 ) (1 ) (5 4 ) (1 )
S
n
n
E vτ
α τ τ τα ω τ τ α ω
+ +  = + −   + + − − , (16) 
and 
 
( )2 2100 (5 7 4 ) 4 (5 9)
| ;
(1 )(5 4 )
S
n
E vτ
α τ α τ τα ω τ α
− − − + +  =   + − . (17) 
Both expectations are increasing in α and τ, and hence the expected quality of spinoffs and 
their parents at the time of their spinoffs are positively correlated. It is also easy to verify 
that | ; | ;S S
n n
E v E vτ τα ω α ω   >        for all τ, so parents of any age are out-performed by their 
spinoffs.  
E. Spinoff and de novo performance. 
The final regularity in Table 1 states that spinoffs are better performers than other de novo 
entrants. The appropriate comparison is of the initial performance of a spinoff formed when a 
parent is age τ with a firm of age 0. First, conditioning on α, it is easy to verify 
that
0 0
| | (1 )S SE v E v A θα α α σ   = = − −       , so that spinoffs formed when their parents are very 
young (an unlikely event) perform on average no better or worse than a de novo firm of the 
same α-type. We have also just seen that |SE vτ α     is increasing in τ, so that spinoffs with 
parents of any age outperform α-type de novo firms of the same α-type. As α-type firms of 
age zero outperform β(α)-type firms of the same age, spinoffs also outperform β(α)-type 
firms with the same value of α. However, there is again a potential ambiguity introduced 
after taking expectations over α, because 
Sτα α<  when 0τ τ> . Thus, for 0τ τ≤ , spinoffs 
on average outperform de novo firms, although this may not be true for sufficiently large 
values of τ.   
V. Discussion 
Intra-industry spinoffs raise numerous questions regarding theory and policy.  They are ex-
ceptional performers.  Is this because they take something from their employer?  If so, does 
this affect the incentives of their employer to engage in activities like R&D?  Why don’t 
their employers pursue their ideas? 
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Answering these and a host of related questions regarding intra-industry spinoffs requires 
understanding their impetus, the motives of their founders, and the consequences for their 
parent firms. This task is complicated because there is surely no single motive for their oc-
currence. We focused on what can be learned about intra-industry spinoffs from accumulat-
ing statistical regularities and leading case studies. We showed that a theory of disagree-
ments born from inherent difficulties in evaluating new ideas by decision makers can provide 
a parsimonious explanation for both the regularities and case studies.  While this does not 
preclude other motivations from being pertinent, hopefully it inspires confidence in the role 
of our theory in explaining intra-industry spinoffs. 
Our model emphasizes that firms are not unitary actors, which can lead to disagreements 
about the best course of action for a firm. If dissidents have superior ideas, then spinoffs will 
generally be superior performers, a result which is virtually built into the model. At the same 
time, before their departure the dissidents will contribute to their parents being superior per-
formers.  Consequently, over their lifetime firms that spawn spinoffs will be superior per-
formers. Disagreements are associated with misleading signals, however, so that at the time 
of their spinoffs parents may be in decline and possibly no longer superior performers, consis-
tent with a number of the case studies. The model implies that the performance of spinoffs 
and the performance of their parents, both over their lifetimes and at the time of their 
spinoffs, will be positively correlated. Other theories have attributed this to the superior 
learning environment for employees at better firms (cf. Franco and Filson [2006]), but our 
theory demonstrates this is not needed to explain the correlation. Our theory readily explains 
the repeated finding that organizational changes within firms tend to raise the probability of 
spinoffs. It can also explain the initial rise and then fall in the probability of spinoffs as firms 
age, although the eventual decline in the spinoff rate requires a firm’s strategic target to re-
main constant over time, which is surely a limiting feature of the model.  
Our theory was not designed to address normative issues regarding spinoffs, but it does offer 
a novel perspective on such issues. We assumed that firms can have difficulty evaluating 
novel ideas, although the novelty of ideas is left implicit in our model. And while we have no 
mechanisms in the model for learning and imitation, which might be thought of as corner-
stones for normative implications in our perspective, it seems inevitable that novel ideas will 
generate positive spillovers as other firms, including parents, imitate successful spinoffs 
(Klepper [2007c]). It is consequently not hard to envision how in our perspective spinoffs 
could play a valuable social role. One of the virtues of capitalism is its decentralization of 
decision making (Nelson [1981]). Spinoffs can be thought of as a means to compensate for the 
limitations of incumbent firms regarding decisions about strategy and management. They are 
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thus a key vehicle for the benefits of capitalism to be realized (cf. Hellman and Perotti 
[2006]). To the extent that spinoffs can be suppressed by incumbent firms through the en-
forcement of employee non-competes (Stuart and Sorenson [2003], Marx et al. [2007]) and 
exploitation of the law on trade secrets (Jackson [1998]), it might be advisable to restrict 
such practices (cf. Gilson [1999], Hyde [2003]). 
One of the virtues of our model is that it focuses attention on a distinctive set of issues and 
questions. As we showed, once we drop the assumption that firms are unitary actors then it 
becomes possible to understand the case study evidence we assembled on the leading spinoffs 
and the accumulating stylized facts about intra-industry spinoffs. It is then not much of a 
leap to see how spinoffs could play a central role in the performance of an economy. Our 
model provides a way to understand this and probe it further.  
Appendix 
A. Distributions for First-Passage Problems 
We make use of several results concerning the distributions of first-passage problems. These re-
sults are collected here: 
THEOREM A.1 ( ) * * 21 22* * 111 2lim | , ( 1) 1nnnT F T e φ φφ φ ∞ −+=→∞ = − <∑ . 
Proof. The distribution was first derived by Doob (1949). To show it is strictly less than one, let 
1 * * 2
1 2
( 1) exp{ 2 }j
n
x jφ φ+= − −  and 1kjk ks x== ∑ . We have * * 21 1 2lim exp{ 2 }jk ks jφ φ∞=→∞ < −∑  
* *
1 1 2
exp{ 2 }j jφ φ∞=< −∑ ( ) 1* *1 22 exp{ 2 } 1jφ φ −= − − < ∞ , and the series is absolutely convergent. Note 
also that x1 > 0, and |xk+1| < |xk| k∀ . Hence, using a standard property of absolutely convergent 
alternating series, ( )* * * *1 2 1 1 2lim | , exp{ 2 } 1T F T xφ φ φ φ→∞ ≤ = − < .  
THEOREM A.2 (Choi and Nam [2003, Theorem 7]). The distribution of first passage times for any 
*
1
0φ > , *
2
0φ > ,  and T > 0 is 
 ( ) 2 31 * * 21 2
1 2 3
2 (2 1)* *
1 2
1
| , 1 ( ) ( ) ( )
j j
j j
x xx
j
jx x x
F T d s e d s d sφ φφ φ
∞ − −
=− − −
       = − Ψ + Ψ + Ψ      
∑∫ ∫ ∫  
                                                         
4 5
* * 2
1 2
4 5
8 ( ) ( )
j j
j j
x x
j
x x
e d s d sφ φ−
− −
      − Ψ + Ψ       
∫ ∫ , 
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where Ψ(s) is the standard normal distribution, * *
1 1 2
Tx Tφ φ= + , * *
2 1 2
(3 4 )
j
Tx j Tφ φ= − + , 
* *
3 1 2
(4 1)
j
Tx j Tφ φ= − + , * *
4 1 2
(1 4 )
j
Tx j Tφ φ= − + , and * *
5 1 2
(1 4 )
j
Tx j Tφ φ= + + . 
THEOREM A.3 (Abundo [2002, Theorem 3.3)]). The crossing probability for a two-sided Brownian 
bridge with initial value 0, terminal value η at time T, and boundaries 
0 1
( )tβ β± +  is  
 ( ) ( )0 1 0
2 ( / ) /
0 1
0 1
1 ( 1) , if 
; , ,
1, otherwise
j T j Tj
j
e t
P T
β β β η η β βη β β
+∞ − + −
=−∞
 − − < += 
∑ . 
B. Conditional Expected Firm Values. 
B.1 Derivation of |NE vτ α     and 
NE vτ
    . Conditional on θ, the value of a firm of age τ is given by 
 ( )2v A xτ τθ= − − . (B.1) 
Substituting (6) into (B.1): 
 ( ) ( )
2
1
1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
( )
n
n n i n n n
i
v A s s
n
θ
τ τ τ
θ
τσθ ω λω α ω λωτσ σ
−
=
    = − − − + − + − +    +  ∑  (B.2) 
We consider first the average value, | 0NE vτ α >   , of α-type firms that have not spawned a 
spinoff. We begin by fixing φτ at some arbitrary value, say  0φ  within the admissible range , 
* *
0 1 2
φ φ φ τ< +  (see Figure B.1). This implies that 
n
s τ  and 
1
1
n
i i
s τ
−
=∑  are related by  
 
1
0
1
( 1) 1
1( 1) (1 ( 1)(1 ))(1 )
n
n i
i
n
n
s s
nn
τ τ
αφ σ
λ τ α ω
−
=
−= + −− + − − − ∑ . (B.3) 
Substituting (B.3) into (B.2) and letting 11
n
i i
y s τ
−
== ∑  yields 
      
2
0
0
( 1)
( , , , )
( 1)( )( 1)( ) (( 1)(1 ) 1)(1 )
N
n
n
v y A y
nn n
θ θ
τ
θθ
ατσ φ σ τσα θ φ θ τσ στ λ τσ σ α ω
  −  = − − −  − + − + − − + − 
. 
Taking expectations over all values of y, 
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2
0
0
( 1)
( , , )
( 1)( )( 1)( ) (( 1)(1 ) 1)(1 )
N
n
n
v A y
nn n
θ θ
τ
θθ
ατσ φ σ τσα θ φ θ τσ στ λ τσ σ α ω
∞
−∞
  −  = − − −  − + − + − − + − ∫  
                                                                           
0
( | )
y
f y dyφ× ,           (B.4) 
where 
0
( | )
y
f y θ  is given by the joint probability that 11ni is yτ−= =∑  and ns τ  satisfies (B.3). That 
is,  
( ) ( )00
( 1)
0 1( 1) (1 ( 1)(1 ))(1 )( 1)
1( 1) (1 ( 1)(1 ))(1 )
1
( | ) ( )
( )
n n
n n
n y
y y s nnn y
y s nn
f y y
y dy
τ
τ
αφ σ
λ τ α ωαφ σ
λ τ α ω
φ ψ ψ
ψ ψ
−
−∞ − + − − −−
−− + − − −−∞
= ⋅ +
⋅ +∫
, 
where ( )
y
yψ  is the density of a Normal random variable with mean ( 1)n θ−  and variance 
( 1) / )n σ τ−  and ( )
ns n
s
τ τ
ψ  is the density of a Normal random variable with mean θ and variance 
(1 ) /α σ τ− . It is next necessary to exclude sample paths such as (b) in Figure B.1, while includ-
ing paths such as (a). If the history of the firm did not matter, the distribution of φτ would be 
truncated normal with mean zero and truncation points at * *
1 2
( )φ φ τ± + . However, values of φτ 
close to the truncation points are more likely to have had sample paths that crossed one of the 
φ
0 tτ
* *
1 2tφ φ+
* *
1 2tφ φ− −
0φ
1φ
(a)
(b)
(d)
(c)
Figure B.1 
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boundaries at some earlier point in time, and they will consequently appear among the sample of 
firms that have never spawned spinoffs less frequently than is predicted by 
0
( | )
y
f y θ . To account 
for this, let ( , )
o
P φ τ  denote the probability that 
0
φ  is reached without φt first crossing either 
boundary. Then an appropriate adjustment to the Normal density for each admissible 
0
φ  is given 
by 
 ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
* *
1 2
* * * * * *
1 2 1 2 1 2
0
1
,
,
, ( )
o
o o
P
P d
τφ φτ τ
φ φ τ
φφ φ τ φ φ τ φ φ τ
φ τζ φ τ
φ τ φ+Ψ + −Ψ − − − −
=
Ψ∫


, (B.5) 
where 
0 0
( )θ φΨ  is the Normal distribution with zero mean and variance τ. The distribution 
( , )
o
P φ τ  is the complement of the crossing probability for a two-sided Brownian bridge with ini-
tial value 0, terminal value 
0
φ  at time τ, and boundaries * *
1 2
( )tφ φ± + . Its formula is obtained di-
rectly from Theorem A.3. Using (B.5) to weight (B.4) and then integrating over all admissible 
values of 
0
φ  yields 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* *
1 2
* *
1 2
0 0* * * * 0
1 2 1 2
1
( , ) , ,N N
t
v v d
τ
τ τ
φ φ τ
τ φ
φ φ τφ φ
α θ ζ φ τ θ φ φφ φ τ φ φ τ
+
− −
= ΨΨ + − Ψ − − ∫  
                      
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* *
1 2
* *
1 2
* *
1 2* *
1 2
0 0 0
1
, ,
, ( )
N
t
o o
P v d
P d
τ
τ
φ φ τ
φφ φ τ
φ φ τφφ φ τ
φ τ θ φ φ
φ τ φ
+
+
− −
− −
= Ψ
Ψ
∫∫
. 
Next, we take expectations over θ: 
 | ( , ) ( )N NE v v dτ τ θα α θ θ
∞
−∞
  = Ψ   ∫ , (B.6) 
where ( )θ θΨ  is zero-mean Normal with variance (1 ) θα σ− . The final step is to take expectations 
over α. Let * *
1 1
( | ) 1 ( | , )Nf Fτ τ α τ φ φ= −  denote the probability that a firm has not formed a 
spinoff by age τ, and let ( )fα α , [ , ]α α α∈ , denote the population distribution of α. Then, the 
expected value of α among firms that have not spawned formed a spinoff by age τ is 
 
1
| ( | ) ( )
( | ) ( )
N N
a N
aa
E f f d
f f d
α
τ α
ατ
α τ α τ α α α
τ α α α
  =   ∫ ∫ ,  (B.7) 
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while the expected value of these firms is given by 
 
1
| ( | ) ( )
( | ) ( )
N N N
a N
aa
E v E v f f d
f f d
α
τ τ τ α
ατ
α τ α α α
τ α α α
   =      ∫ ∫ . (B.8) 
Derivation of |SE vτ α     and 
SE vτ
    . This derivation is simpler. The first-passage problem is sym-
metric, so the average value of firms at the lower boundary is the same as at the upper boundary. 
Thus, we can fix φτ at the value of the upper boundary at time τ, * *1 1 2φ φ φ τ= + , and ignore the 
lower boundary. Moreover, the terminal value of the Brownian motion is fixed at a single point, 
so there is no need to devise any weighting scheme to eliminate sample paths such as (d) in Fig-
ure B.1. Thus, we need only replace 
0
φ  with * *
1 2
φ φ τ+  in (B.4) to obtain ( , )Svτ α θ . Taking expec-
tations over θ yields 
 | ( , ) ( )S SE v v dτ τ θα α θ θ
∞
−∞
  = Ψ   ∫ . (B.9) 
Let * *
1 1
( | ) ( | , )Sf Fτ τ α τ φ φ′=  denote the density of spinoff times conditional on α (from Theorem 
A.2). Then, by Bayes’ rule, the expected value of α for firms that spawn a spinoff at age τ is 
given by 
 
1
[ | ] ( | ) ( )
( | ) ( )
S S
S
E f f
f f d
α
τ αα
ατα
α τ α τ α α
τ α α α
=
∫ ∫ , (B.10) 
and the unconditional expected value of these firms is  
 
1
| ( | ) ( )
( | ) ( )
S S S
S
E v E v f f
f f d
α
τ τ τ αα
ατα
α τ α α
τ α α α
   =      ∫ ∫ . (B.11) 
Derivation of |E vβτ α     and E v
β
τ
    . Because β-type firms produce no disagreements, the expected 
value of these firms conditional on θ is immediately obtained upon substituting 0α =  into (7) 
and (8): 
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22 2
2 2 2
( , )
( ) ( )
v A
n
β θ
τ
θ θ
τσ σθ σα θ τσ σ τσ σ= − −+ + , 
and taking expectations over θ yields 
 
( )
2
(1 )
[ | ]
( )
n
E v A
n
θ θβ
τ
θ
σ σ τσ σ αα τσ σ
+ −= − + . (B.12) 
The expected value of α among β(α)-type firms is equal to the population mean, 
[ ] ( )E f dαα α α α= ∫ , while the unconditional expectation of firm value is given by 
 
( )
2
(1 [ ])
[ ]
( )
n E
E v A
n
θ θβ
τ
θ
σ σ τσ σ α
τσ σ
+ −= − +  (B.13) 
Subsection IV.C reports numerical evaluations of several of these equations using parameter val-
ues n=5, σθ=100, σ=100, k=1, ωn=0.2, and f(α)=U[0.6,0.9].  
Derivation of |SE vτ α    . Given signals y and  ns τ , the strategy initially chosen by a spinoff 
launched when the parent is age τ is obtained upon setting  1
n
ω =  in (B.2). The initial value of 
the spinoff is consequently given by 
 
( ) 2(1 )
( (1 ) )( )
nS
s y
v A
n
θ τ
τ
θ
τσ αθ α α τσ σ
 + −   = − −  − + +  
 . 
Substituting for 
n
s τ  using (B.3), setting 
* *
1 1 2
φ φ φ τ= + , and taking expectations over y yields 
 
2
* *
1 2
(1 ) ( )
( , ) ( | )
( 1)(1 )( )
S n
y
n
y n k
v A f y dy
n
θ θ
τ
θ
ατσ ω τσ σα θ θ φ φ τα ω τσ σ
∞
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 − − +  = − − +  − − +  ∫ . 
Finally, taking expectations over θ yields 
 | ( , ) ( )S SE v v dτ τ θα α θ θ
∞
−∞
  = Ψ   ∫  . (B.14) 
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